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self-incrimination may be claimed by witnesses called before a congressional committee

inquiring into communistic activities. (Cf. Barsky v. United States (1948), 167 F. 2d
241, cert. denied 334 U. S. 843, 68 S. Ct. 1511, 92 L. Ed. 1767.) ' Previous attempts
to avoid giving testimony before such groups on the ground that the questions violate
the first amendment of the Constitution, in that they constitute an unwarranted
intrusion by government into the prohibited areas of thought and opinion, were rejected. (Lawson v. United States (1950), 176 F. 2d 49, cert. denied, 339 U. S. 933, 70
S. Ct. 663, 94 L. Ed. 1352.) There remains to investigators the remedy of requiring
production of books and records of the party, notwithstanding that such production
might result in personal incrimination of the possessor. (White v. United States (1943),
322 U. S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542.) Practical difficulties are presented in
proving possession. Proper claiming of the privilege protects the witness from disclosure of possession since possession connects the witness with the party.
Although the incriminatory matter in the instant cases was membership in the
party, this does not necessarily indicate that the party advocates overthrow of the
government by force and violence. Proof of membership in the organization is but
one link in the chain of evidence essential to a conviction for violation of the Smith
Act. (United States v. Burr, supra.) The Circmt Court, Rogers v. United States; Blau
v. United States, 180 F. 2d 103 (C. C. A. 10th.), upheld the conviction on the ground
that membership in the Communist party is not in and of itself crimnnal, citing
Schneiderman v. United States (1943), 320 U. S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed. 1797.
That case actually held that the government had failed to carry the burden of proof
in an attempt to show that the Communist Party was an organization advocating
overthrow of the government by force and violence. (320 U. S. 118, 154, 158.) The
court also remarked:
"For some tume the question whether advocacy of governmental overthrow by force
and violence is a principle of the Communist Party of the United States has perplexed
courts, administrators, legislators, and students ....
This court has never passed on
the question and it is unnecessary for us to do so now."

The status of the Communist Party under the Smith Act is currently in issue.,
There was a real danger that petitioners might be subjected to prosecution for membership in the party. Extension of the privilege seems well applied.
James H. McAlister.
LIBEL AND SLANDER: MITIGATION OF DAMAGES-CONSTITUTIONALITY AND
SCOPE OF NEWSPAPER LIBEL RETRACTION STATUTE.-From the very outset of the law of
defamation, there have been conflicting views expressed in the establishment of the

closely related torts of libel and slander. Opposing ideas of policy-one being our
traditional concept of freedom of expression, the other our sense of justice and sympathy for those whose good name has been maligned-have been largely responsible
for the somewhat arbitrary and often illogical rules set down by the courts. In the
last century, the tendency seemed to be toward the extension of the law of defamation,
somewhat as the early common law, but more recently the shift is toward a more
restricted liability.' There has not, however, been any satisfactory resolution of the
'See "Applicability of Prvilege Against Self-Incnmination to Legislative Investigations," 49.
Col. L. Rev. 87, 88, n. 2, where it is stated, concerning applicability of the privilege to inqiries
concerning Communist Party membership, "Unless such membership is crimmal, it seems clear that
the privilege affords no protection to witnesses relying on it to avoid admission of such membership."
5
United States v. Dennis et al. (C. C. A. 2 (1950)); 183 F. 2d 201, certiorari granted,
71 S. Ct. 91.
iProsser on Torts, pp. 778 et seq.
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contrary positions, despite several attempts by authorities in the law of torts, probably
because of the violent policy dispute as to which direction the law should take.2
One aspect of defamation-that of damages-seems to have been particularly open
to reflecting the ebb and flow of first one policy, then another. California, in recent
years, has enacted legislation demonstrably designed to lessen liability, at least in
the field of mass communication, namely, newspapers and radio and television broadcasting stations. In 1931, a retraction or correction statute, Civil Code, section 48a,
applicable to newspaper libels,
was enacted, 3 and in 1945, it was amended to cover
4
broadcast.
radio
by
slander
Two recent cases, Werner v. Southern CaliforniaAssociated Newspapers (1950),
35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 Pac. 2d 825, and Pridonoff v. Balokovich (1950), 36 A. C. 290 and
36 A. C. 751 (1951), 223 P. 2d 854, have upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Code,
section 48a, and extended its application to individuals who, in one way or another,
participate in the publication of the defamatory statement. The statute, whose constitutionality had not heretofore been raised, provides that the plaintiff, within twenty
days after knowledge of the publication or the broadcast, must make written demand
of a correction or retraction. If a correction is not published within three weeks of
such demand, in substantially as conspicuous a manner as the original defamatory
statements, the plaintiff can recover general and special damages, and may also recover
exemplary damages, in the discretion of the court or jury, if he pleads and proves
actual malice. However, if the plaintiff fails to serve the written demand upon the
publisher, he can recover only special damages.'
It is this last provision which raised the constitutional issue, and which served
to evoke a sharp dissent from two justices of the California Supreme Court. Before
the Werner and Pridonoff cases are discussed, a brief survey of the development in
the field of retractions may prove helpful as a background for analysis.
At common law, a showing of special damages, i.e., actual pecuniary injury, was
necessary for a recovery in slander actions, except where the defamation fitted into
the category of slander per se, in which case injury was presumed., In libel cases,
however, the plaintiff might recover, in addition to pecuniary loss, general damages for
the presumed injury to reputation and loss of business. 7 Further, the jury might assess
exemplary or punitive damages where malice had been alleged and proved. 8
Though a retraction of the defamatory statement is not a defense to an action
for defamation, it may be introduced to rebut the malice required for punitive damages,
and in mitigation of damages, provided it is full, fair, and unequivocal. 9
In the absence of statutory provisions, a newspaper as such has no special immunity from liability.' 9 Newspapers, perhaps because of their recognized potential
'Paton, Reform and the English Law of Defamation, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 669, 675; Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 II1.L. Rev. 36, 45; Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 Columbia L. Rev. 463, 469-470.
'Cal. Stats. (1931), c. 1018, p. 2034; see S. F. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 183 Cal. 273, 279, 191
Pac. 26.
'In 1949, a new section was added limiting liability of radio and television broadcasting stations
where due care has been exercised in the prevention of defamatory statements, or where censoring
is impossible by reason of federal regulation or statute.
'Cal.
Civ. Code, sec. 48a defines general damages, special damages, and exemplary damages,
4

in par. (a), (b) and (c).
'Prosser on Torts, p. 798.
'Bohan v. Record Pub. Co., 1 Cal. App. 429, 82 Pac. 634; Taylor v. Hearst, 107 CaL 262,
40 Pac.
392.
8
Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 22 Pac. 2d 569.
9
Taylor v. Hearst, supra; Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal. 394, 47 Pac. 129.
'°Edwards v. San Jose Printing & Pub. Soc., 99 Cal. 431, 34 Pac. 128; Morcom v. San Francisco

Shopping News Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 284, 40 Pac. 2d 940.
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for great harm, were once held to strict liability, even where through an honest and
reasonable mistake the wrong person was defamed, or where the statement was not
intended in any defamatory sense. 1
But in at least twenty states,'1 2 statutes have been enacted purporting to lessen
the liability of newspapers for inadvertent libel when a retraction is published. There
seems to be no dispute about the competency of the Legislature in making retraction
a bar to the recovery of punitive damages.' 3 Beyond this, there is conflict. Some of
these statutes provided that the plaintiff shall recover only "actual damages," but they
have been construed to exclude only exemplary damages, thus, in effect, leaving the
common law intact. 14 Three other statutes which specifically confined recovery to
special damages suffered in respect of property, business, trade, profession, or occupation, and excluded recovery for damages to reputation or character, were held unconstitutional. 15 On the other hand, a Minnesota case,' 6 upholding the Minnesota
statute, decided that no constitutional provision was violated by prohibiting the recovery
of money damages for the presumed injuries to reputation which are not pecuniary
in nature. However, it should be noted that the operation of the statute was limited
to cases of "good faith," 1which
not only went to the absence of malice, but also to
7
the absence of negligence.
California Civil Code, section 48a, goes further and limits recovery to special
damages in any case where there has been retraction, or denies recovery beyond special
damages where the plaintiff has failed to demand retraction in compliance with the
statute. It should be noted here that the original retraction statute enacted in 1931
dealt only with libelous matter published in good faith, without malice, and under a
nstake as to the facts, but the 1945 amendment includes no requirement of establishing defendant's good faith as a prerequisite to freedom from liability for general
damages.
The Werner case arose before the Pridonoff case, and will be discussed first.
The defendant newspaper in the Werner case had allegedly publishd a libel' 8 to the
effect that the plaintiff had been convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison. The
plaintiff failed to allege special damages or compliance with section 48a, and the
trial court sustained defendant's demurrer and dismissed the action. On appeal, the
District Court of Appeal, one judge dissenting (206 Pac. 2d 952), decided that the
statute was unconstitutional as violating the speech responsibility clause and the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution and also the equal protection and due
process clauses of the United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. The court reasoned
that the common law liability of libel was intended to be incorporated in the speech.
responsibility clause of the California Constitution, and that any statute attempting
to limit that liability was depriving the plaintiff of a property right without due process
of law.' 9 The California Supreme Court, Justices Carter and Schauer writing separate
dissents, reversed in favor of the defendant, and upheld the statute.
"'Hulton & Co. v. Jones, 2 K. B. 44; Taylor v. Hearst, supra.
"See list in 33 Minn. L. Rev. 609, 614.
"Comer v. Age Herald Pub. Co., 151 Ala. 613, 44 So. 673; Pentuff v. Park, 194 N. C.
138 S. E. 616.
"'Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 538, 84 N. E. 1018; Comer v. Age Herald Pub.
supra;Osbom v. Leach, 135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E. 811; Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 45 N. D.
178 N. W 792; Webb v. Call Pub. Co., 173 Wise. 45, 180 N. W. 263.
"Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041; Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich.
40 N. W 731, 13 A. L. R. 799; Osborn v. Leach, supra.
'Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117,41 N. W. 936.
"Thorson v. Albert Lea Pub. Co., 190 Minn. 200, 251 N. W 177.
"'See Cal. Civ. Code, section 45, for definition of libel.
"23 So. Cal. L. Rev. 89; 34 Minn. L. Rev. 249; 99 U. of Penn. L. Rev. 107.

146,
Co.,
568,
560,
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Civil Code, section 48a, was held not in contravention of California Constitution,
article I, section 9, since the constitutional provision was not intended to guaranty
a remedy to those injured by the defamation, but only to make clear that the right of
free speech does not guaranty immunity from liability to those who abuse it. The
issues of the due process clause and the equal protection of the laws were examined
by the court, and the majority opinion stated that the Legislature might reasonably
conclude that the public interest in the dissemination of news outweighed the possible
injury to a plaintiff from the publication of a libel, and might properly encourage and
protect news dissemination by relieving newspapers and radio stations from all but
special damages resulting from defamation, upon the publication of a retraction. Since,
at common law, it was conclusively presumed that general damages resulted from the
publication of a libel, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that recovery of
damages without proof of injury constituted an evil. It was pointed out that the Legislature had already attacked the evils of unfounded litigation, by abolishing certain
causes of action altogether, namely, alienation of affection, criminal conversation,
seduction of a person over the age of legal consent, and breach of promise to marry.
The court refused to presume that in reaching a decision, the Legislature acted on
improper motives in choosing between conflicting policies. On the contention of arbitrary and unreasonable classification, the majority stated that legislative classification
is reasonable if there are differences between the classes established, and the differences
are reasonably related to the purposes of the statute. The distinction between newspapers and radio on the one hand and all other forms of news dissemination and
publication in general on the other was held a reasonable exercise of the legislative
process, and not arbitrary or improper.
Justice Carter, in a vigorous and mordant dissenting opinion, attacked the majority's argument that a retraction was an effective remedy for the damage caused by
defamation, especially in view of the tremendous scope of such modern media of communication and news dissemination. On the latter point, that the business of news
publication necessarily made difficult the checking of all statements, and that danger
of excessive damages would hamper the effectiveness of a free press, the dissent pointed
out that neither these reasons nor the difficulty in adequate checking of news which
must speedily be put in print should outweigh damages to an individual's reputation.
The effect of the statute is to grant to newspapers and radio the power to inflict permanent injury while at the same time removing all practical possibility of recovery for
such injury, since special damages are difficult of proof in most cases. Justice Schauer,
also dissenting, felt that the speech responsibility clause of the California Constitution,
article I, section 9, was of more than mere negative significance, and that the effect of
the statute was to allow even deliberate and malicious libel to be immune from either
general or punitive damages.
There was an appeal from the decision, to the United States Supreme Court, and
while this appeal was pending, the Pridonoff case arose. In this case, the defendant
authors, apparently not engaged in the newspaper business, had allegedly caused to be
published in a California newspaper a statement that the plaintiff had engaged in
certain activities, while a member of an American embassy abroad, sufficient to bring
about his recall to the United States. The words were libelous in that they implied
that he was not fit for his position and tended to injure him in his occupation. The
plaintiff, as in the Werner case, failed to allege a demand for a correction and that no
correction was published, and this was held to preclude recovery of general or exemplary damages. However, plaintiff did allege special damages, in that as a result of the
publication of the libel he lost employment with a named employer for a specified
period, to his damage in a named amount. Again, Justices Carter and Schauer, though
concurring in the reversal in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds that allegations of
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special damages were sufficiently specific to sustain a cause of action therefor, dissented from that portion of the majority decision which held that the plaintiff could
not recover general or exemplary damages because of his failure to demand retraction
pursuant to the provisions of Civil Code, section 48a.
The Pridonoff case came up on rehearing, 20 but not on constitutional grounds.
Plaintiff had contended that by virtue of the provision requiring service of demand for
correction on the publisher; Civil Code, section 48a, applied only to the newspaper
publisher, and not to his employees, columnists, and other authors, and that since his
action was against the individual authors of the alleged libel and not against the newspaper publisher, the statute was inapplicable in his case. But the same majority held
that notwithstanding that the action was against the actual author of the article, rather
than the publisher, Civil Code, section 48a, precluded recovery of more than special
damages unless plaintiff serves a notice on the publisher demanding retraction, and no
retraction is published. It was pointed out that only the publisher had the power to
make the proper retraction, and in providing for the substitution of a retraction for
general and exemplary damages, it was reasonable for the Legislature to provide that
the notice be served upon him.
Justice Carter again dissented, on two grounds: (1) the statute does not apply
to authors of articles or letters published in newspapers, and (2) the statute is unconstitutional. (On this latter point, raised by the dissent in the first Pridonoff case, it
was felt that the ultimate validity of Civil Code, section 48a, would be decided by the
United States Supreme Court. However, in the period between the first and second
Pridonoff cases, a settlement was made of the plaintiff's claim in the Werner case, and
the appeal had been dismissed. 2 1 This left the statute's validity, as determined by the
highest state court, intact as of this writing.)
Justice Carter, referring to the broadened scope now given to section 48a, questions the logic of classifying authors of libelous statements according to whether their
statements are published by newspapers or by other means. Assuming, for the sake
of argument only, that the Legislature reasonably sought to protect newspapers and
radio stations from the danger of excessive damages in actions against them, because
of their reputed ability to pay, and also that the Legislature could reasonably conclude
that, because the effectiveness of a retraction by a newspaper with wide circulation
greatly outweighed the retraction of an individual, there could properly be a basis for
classifying newspapers and radio stations apart, yet individual authors are not within
the class of persons conspicuously subject to unfounded and extortionate suits, nor
are they engaged in the business of operating newspapers, nor are authors disseminating news.
Further, the Comer v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. case, 151 Ala. 622, 44 So. 676,
677, is directly in point, in that a statute 22 similar to California Civil Code, section 48a,
was held inapplicable to an individual defendant, not a publisher, who had prepared
an article which he had paid the newspaper to publish. The court in that case recognized the basis for protecting newspapers who are in the business of disseminating
news, and the possibility of inadvertent libel, but the same basis did not apply to individuals. However, the California court, in the Pridonoff case, saw fit not to follow the
Comer case.
Justice Schauer, also dissenting, reiterated his position as a staunch supporter of
the constitutional freedoms of speech and press as against prior restraint, but felt
2036 A. C. 751 (1951).

2119 U. S. Law Week, Feb. 6,1951, Supplement to Index, p. 11.
"Act Feb. 20,1899 (Gen. Acts, 1898-99, p. 32), amending Code 1896, see. 1441.
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that the injustices which might flow from the lack of prior restraint, should be deterred,
mitigated or compensated by subsequent responsibility, general and punitive, for abuses
of that right. He disagreed with the majority in the Werner case, which held that
although Civil Code, section 48a, extends its protection to those who may deliberately
and maliciously disseminate libels, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that it
was necessary to go that far so as to effectively protect those who in good faith and
without malice inadvertently publish a defamation. Justice Schauer bitterly commented
that the majority was immunizing an author of a slander or libel, whether inadvertent
or deliberate, so that one could maliciously compose the vilest calumny, and by merely
procuring its publication in a newspaper, or by a broadcasting company, by paid
advertisement or otherwise, "come within the encouraging arms of section 48a and
repose securely immune from either general or punitive damages."
Having come this far, it can be stated that California has taken a most extreme
position in this matter of retraction and mitigation of damages. Until cases of this
kind reach the United States Supreme Court, the constitutionality of the newspaper
libel retraction statute will likely stand. How far its protecting mantle shall extend is
as yet uncertain, though it is clear that it is not limited to newspapers and radio stations.
In the opinion of the writer, there is some validity in the argument that there is an
abuse of the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws, in that in any classification
made by a state legislature, must pass the test set down in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Penn.
(1928), 277 U. S. 389, 406, 48 S. Ct. 553, 556, 72 L. Ed. 927, by Justice Brandeis:
"In passing upon legislation assailed under the equality clause we have declared that
the classification must rest upon a difference which is real, as distinguished from one
which is seeming, specious, or fanciful, so that all actually situated similarly will be
treated alike, that the object of the classification must be the accomplishment of a
purpose or the promotion of a policy, which is within the permissible functions of the
state and that the difference must bear a relation to the object of the legislation which
is substantial, as distinguished from one which is speculative, remote, or negligible.
Subject to this limitation of reasonableness, the equality clause has left unimpaired,
both in range and in flexibility, the state's power to classify for purposes of taxation."
(Emphasis added.)
Should the constitutionality of section 48a withstand this test, it would be going
beyond any other comparable statute, most of which were held invalid on lesser provisions. it would seem preferable, on policy grounds at least, that California be in
accord with those other states which have enacted retraction statutes, if not in accord
with the common law liability for newspaper defamation. There would be no objection,
for example, were California to reestablish the former requirement of good faith,
absence of malice, etc., which existed in the 1931 version of section 48a. This would
be a return to the middle position between absolute liability and absolute immunity,
perhaps the most workable synthesis of the problem in an otherwise unsatisfactory
state of the law.
In view of current political conditions, conducive of "smear and run" tactics by an
unethical few, it might be timely to recall the meaningful words of Shakespeare's Iago:
"Good name in man and woman, dear my lord.
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed."
(Othello, Act III, Scene 3)

Rubin Tepper.

